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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EUGENE MEYERS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10944 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a criminal case wherein 
the appellant seeks review of a judgment and conviction 
of possession of narcotic drugs rendered by a jury on 
the 8th day of February, 1967 before the Honorable 
Merrill C. Faux, Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried by Jury and convicted 
of Possession of a Narcotic Drug, to wit: Heroin and 
1 
Demeral, in a three-day trial. A stay of execution was ' 
granted pending this appeal. 
The defendant's motion to quash the search war-
rant was held before the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow on April 20, 1966 and denied. Defendant's mo-
tion to suppress all items seized and any oral testimony 
as to what was seized or observed was held on N ovem-
ber 29, 1965 before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft 
and denied. The defendant's motion for new trial was 
held before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux on the 3rd 
day of March, 1967 and denied. 
At the time of trial, the motion to suppress was 
renewed and denied. A continuing objection was pre-
served by the defendant with permission of the trial i 
court, Honorable Merrill C. Faux. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
ruling on the motion to quash the search warrant, mo· 
tion to suppress the items taken from the premises and 
oral testimony relating thereto and the admissibility 
of statements of the defendant. In the alternative, the 
appellant seeks a judgment of acquittal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was charged with possession of nar· 
cotic drugs, to wit: heroin, dilandid and demeral on 
the 29th day of June, 1965. 
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Officer Fran Kari of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, accompanied by Officers Donald D. Lind-
sey and Daniel W. Waters, went to a residence located 
at 553 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah on June 
29, 1965 at approximately 9:30 a.m. (Tr. 41) The 
avowed purpose of going to the residence was to serve 
a "search warrant" which called for the pickup of one 
Elizabeth Ann Glasgow, a minor, who was believed 
to be harbored at the residence by the appellant and 
Dave Beckstead. (Tr-154) The method of obtaining 
the search warrant is referred below in Point II. 
Upon their arrival, they observed a Mr. Brown, 
who identified himself as a property-manager for Tracy-
Collins Bank and Trust. (Tr-115) Mr. Brown stated 
that he was there to investigate a complaint of nuisance. 
(Tr-115) The residence had been rented to one Mrs. 
Gibson on June 17, 1965 on a monthly basis. (Tr-116) 
The rent, in fact, was current at the time of this inci-
dent. (Tr-132) The rental agreement, Exhibit 3, was 
received in evidence over defendant's objection as to 
no foundation. ( Tr-202) Mrs. Gibson was identified 
as Virginia Hall through a photograph. (Tr-117) The 
appellant was also outside of the residence when the 
officers arrived. (Tr-42, 117) Mr. Brown had let 
himself inside the residence and, after hearing the door 
bell, answered the door and the defendant was at the 
door. ( Tr-117) It was at this point that the officers 
arrived. (Tr-119) Whereupon, Mr. Brown "gave them 
permission to enter the house." (Tr-119) The defend-
ant, who also entered, was standing behind the kitchen 
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door. (Tr-119) Francis Kari informed Mr. Brown 
that she had a search and seizure warrant and Mr. 
Brown stated that it was alright. (Tr-154) In response 
to her inquiry, the appellant said that he "was there 
to mow the lawn." (Tr-156, 170) Francis Kari did 
not show Mr. Brown or the defendant the warrant. 
( Tr-42, 129, 165) Officer Lindsey having entered the 
house talked to the defendant whereupon defendant 
made the statement about mowing the lawn. (Tr-54) 
The appellant did not ask for a warrant. (Tr-50, 54) 
This officer testified that he entered the residence under 
the authority of the search warrant and with the per· 
mission of Mr. Brown. ( Tr-54) . 
After entering the house the officers proceeded to 
search the premises ultimately reaching an upstairs 
locked bedroom, marked Bedroom "A" on Exhibits 
2-D. (Tr-134, 139) Mr. Brown, the trustee, did not 
have the key so Officer Lindsey dispatched Officer , 
Waters to obtain the same from the main office of 
Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust ( Tr-54, 32) with the 
permission of Mr. Brown. (Tr-32) Between the time 
of entry into the house and the unlocking of Bedroom 
"A", the appellant was permitted to leave. (Tr-33, 57) 
No conversation was had concerning the locked Bed· 
room "A". 
Upon entering Bedroom "A", it became appar· 
rent to all three officers that there was no one present. 
( Tr-33, 44, 58) Whereupon, Officers Lindsey and 
Waters began to open closet doors, bureau drawers, 
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ruffle bed sheets and search under the mattresses and 
bed. ( Tr-122, 211, 225) Their avowed purpose was to 
find something as to the whereabouts of Elizabeth Ann 
Glasgow. (Tr-34, 122) Officer Kari proceeded to in-
spect the night stand located near the bed. ( Tr-44, 
158) Her stated purpose was to determine whether the 
minor child had been there or where she might be. 
(Tr-46) 
The night stand is approximately 24-30 inches tall 
with two or three drawers. ( Tr-77) It was so con-
structed that the bottom of the night stand was flush 
against the rug. (Tr-119) The only opening was in 
the back facing the wall. ( Tr-177) Officer Kari pulled 
the night stand away from the wall and observed a 
pa per sack between the floor and the bottom of the last 
drawer, ( Tr-48) the contents of which were imme-
diately placed on the bed and examined by Officers 
Lindsey and Waters. (Tr-158) Out of this paper sack 
came a plastic bag containing various pills, prescription 
bottles and prescription blanks. (Exhibit 5). (Tr-197) 
Moreover, a gum wrapper holding three demeral tab-
lets, (Exhibits 6) another gum wrapper with demeral 
pills, (Exhibit 8) a medicine container holding a clear 
liquid, tested and identified as heroin, (Exhibit 9) 
two clear gelatin found in an Old Gold cigarette pack-
age, (Exhibit 10) ( Tr-218) heroin, (Exhibit 10) and 
a bottle containing heroin and demeral capsules (Ex-
hibit 11) were obtained from the plastic bag. (Tr-113, 
232, 235) Other items found in the plastic bag were 
found to be pills, some of which contained codine. 
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( Tr-232) This proposed Exhibit 7 and testimony re-
lating thereto was stricken by the trial court on defense 
counsel's motion ( Tr-233) and the jury was admon-
ished. ( Tr-233) 
The principle witness for the state in establishing 
the possession charge comes from the testimony of 
Elizabeth Ann Glasgow, a minor, and statements pur-
portedly made by the defendant to Officer Lindsey 
concerning the defendant's clothing, found in Bedroom 
"A". These will be handled in turn. 
Elizabeth Ann Glasgow, age 15, testified that she 
was residing at 553 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City on 
the last three weeks of June, 1965. (Tr-133) She 
moved in on June 14, 1965, some two days before the 
rental agreement had been executed. (Tr-141) She 
may be mistaken as to the date. (Tr-141) She had 
lived with the defendant, Dave Beckstead and Virginia 
Hall. The defendant roomed with Virginia Hall and 
the keys to the Bedroom "A" were held by both. (Tr-
135) The defendant's stay was apparently intermittant 
and occasional. (Tr-136) In the latter part of June, 
1965 she saw the defendant twice with something for-
eign in his hand, to wit, a bottle with pills, however 
she never was able to identify the items nor did she 
ever have a conversation with the defendant concerning 
them. (Tr-137) She recognized the paper bag, Ex-
hibit 5, found under the night stand (Tr-138), and 
testified as follows : 
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Q. (by Kay Lewis): Miss Glasgow, have you seen 
the defendant himself take those pills or put any pills 
into this bag, or a bag similar to this? 
A. No, I haven't. (Tr-138) 
She did see Virginia Hall get pills from the bag 
(Tr-139) when only she and Virgiia Hall were present. 
(Tr-146) Aside from white pills, larger than aspirin, 
and prescription bottles in the plastic bag, (Tr-147) 
she saw nothing else. ( Tr-148) Further, she never wit-
nessed Virginia Hall give the defendant any pills. 
(Tr-144) She left the house on the morning of June 
29, 1965 and just prior to leaving, she saw or heard 
the defendant and Virginia Hall fighting. (Tr-141, 
255) Elizabeth Ann Glasgow, herself, was a runaway 
and was aware that the Juvenile authorities were look-
ing for her. (Tr-245) 
Officer Donald B. Lindsey testified substantially 
as to the same facts as heretofore indicated. In addition 
thereto, he indicated that he had a conversation with 
the defendant regarding the clothing and other ietms, 
such as portable TV, Old Gold cigarettes, auto battery 
and wrist watches, ( Tr-71) and driver's license bearing 
the defendant's name and a different address. (Tr-301) 
These items were seized at Mr. Brown's request for 
safekeeping ( Tr-72) and remain in the police evidence 
room. 
In response to the question as to what items were 
found in Bedroom "A", Officer Lindsey volunteered 
the statement "There were prescription blanks, pill 
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bottles of various types, and clothing around, which 
belonged to the defendant." (Tr-172) The latter's 
statement regarding the ownership of the clothing was 
stricken as being a conclusion on the part of the wit-
ness. ( Tr-173) 
Thereafter, the prosecutor attempted to admit the 
defendant's admission as to the clothing. (Tr-173) At 
the defendant's request an out of jury hearing was 
held. ( Tr-17 4) At this time, defense counsel moved 
for mistrial on the basis that the defense counsel re-
quested an out of jury hearing before the crucial ques-
tion was asked with regard to any conversation had 
with the defendant. ( Tr-17 4) This was denied. (Tr-
175) 
During the out of jury hearing, Officer Lindsey 
could not recall the dates of the conversation nor did 
he take notes of the two conversations held with the 
defendant. ( Tr-17 5) These conversations were had 
after the defendant had been charged. ( Tr-17 5) and 
he was considered a suspect in this possession charge. 
( Tr-176) Defendant was not advised of his right to 
counsel. ( Tr-176) The first conversation was a tele-
phone call initiated by the defendant; (Tr-178) the 
second, in the police car enroute from the city court 
to jail, while he was in custody. (Tr-179) No Miranda 
warning was given in either case. (Tr-180) At the time 
of both converstaions, the Officer Lindsey was well 
aware that defendant was represented by counsel. (Tr-
183) In both conversations, the officer indicated that 
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the defendant wanted his clothes, tool box, car battery, 
and records returned. (Tr-180) A motion to suppress 
was made on the ground that the Miranda warnings 
were not met and further on the grounds that since 
there was no authority under the search warrant to 
seize the items and since the consent of Mr. BroWI}., ·'T 
If/:. l)f p12ciD~,er y ~,q~ 1001 81/\Jf:N(J OllJ Tl:/C DcJ;,E'A.fiJ~fV 
I @:itelaail:ve efl tA!l 'Poi~onomHit aeetFla@; ~ 
IS4) and fm ther that the taking of the al>eve itsim 
the clothes, portable TV, Old Gold cigarettes, wrist 
watches and auto battery was unlawful and therefore 
any conversation relating thereto would be tainted and 
excludible on the "Poisonous fruit" doctrine; (Tr-
184) and further that the taking of the above items 
were accomplished solely for evidentiary value, thus 
coming with the prohibition of the "Mere evidence 
rule." ( Tr-193) The motion was denied. ( Tr-190) A 
continuing objection was preserved. (Tr-191) 
The jury was reconvened and Officer Lindsey 
testified as to the first telephone conversation and the 
second police car conversation wherein the defendant 
stated that he wanted some of the things taken from 
Bedroom "A" returned, to wit: the clothing, auto bat-
tery, and auto accessory. (Tr-190) On cross-examina-
tion, he indicated that the conversations were had after 
the instant case was initially dismised by the committing 
magistrate. ( Tr-209) This matter was refiled. (Tr-
209). 
Thereafter, Officers Lindsey and Waters proceed-
ed to establish the identity of the items found in the 
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plastic bag and established the chain of evidence. (Tr-
194, 202; 218-230) 
Officer Fran Kari was recalled to testify that she 
observed the defendant reach in his pocket and conceal 
something under the rug on the stairway leading to 
the upstairs (Tr-249) An out of jury-hearing was 
held at defense counsel's request and an objection was 
made regarding any of the above testimony as to the 
hiding of the pills on the grounds that the State was 
unable to show that the items were of narcotic char-
acter, which would fall within the categories listed in 
the lnforma ti on. ( Tr-164) This testimony was ordered 
strickened and the jury admonished. ( Tr-251) Defense 
counsel's motion for mistrial on the basis that the ad-
monition by the court would not remove the prejudiced 
effect imbedded in the minds of the jury was denied. 
( Tr-251) Prosecutor was admonished by the trial 
court. ( Tr-251) 
The state rested. ( Tr-251) The defendant's mo· 
tion to dismiss was denied. ( Tr-251) In considering the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court expressed 
doubt as to submitting the matter to the jury since 
there had not been any proof that the defendant knew 
of its narcotic character. (Tr-253) However, the trial 
court then considered the stricken testimony of Francis 
Kari as to observing the defendant secreting some items 
under the carpet. ( Tr-254-255) The trial court recog· 
nized the error of striking the testimony from the jury 
and yet restoring it for the purpose of considering the 
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motion to dismiss. ( Tr-257) Trial court reversed his 
ruling and permitted the testimony of Francis Kari 
to be re-instated for the purpose of this motion, (Tr-
259) and on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. 
(Tr-266, 275) 
At this point, defense counsel requested that the 
items be produced and examined as to narcotic character 
to rebut the inference that is in the minds of the jury 
that the items were narcotics. (Tr-259) The items 
were, in fact, co-mingled with other pills at the police 
station and could not be separated or found at this 
time. ( Tr-259) The trial was continued for one week 
with the defendant's consent, for the purpose of locat-
ing the pills and analyzation. ( Tr-261) 
As the trial resumed a week later, after much dis-
cussion as to the court's procedure, Officer Fran Kari 
was cross-examined by defense counsel. ( Tr-278) She 
did not see anything in the defendant's hands which 
was passed underneath the carpet of the stairway, 
(Tr-278) and she could not recall what the pill and 
capsule looked like. (Tr-279-280) She turned the items 
over to the narcotics man unmarked. ( Tr-282) 
Thereafter, Officer Donald B. Lindsey was re-
called on further direct examination. ( Tr-289) Over 
defense counsel's objection, he was permitted to tes-
tify that items turned over to him by Fran Kari were 
a red capsule, which in his opinion was secondal, non-
narcotic and a pill which was tuinal, non-narcotic. (Tr-
11 
300) He had no opinion as to another item which he 
found himself. (Tr-314) 
Defense counsel's motion to dismiss was renewed. 
and denied. ( Tr-314) Motion for mistrial was renewed 
and denied. The word "dilaudid" was stricken from the 
Information and the jury instructed to disregard it. ' 
( Tr-315) One specific motion for mistrial was renewed 
with respect to State's Exhibit 7 and 17, which estab-
lished that codine was also found in the Bedroom "A" 
(Tr-316), which evidence and exhibits were stricken 
from the jury. This motion was denied. (Tr-317) 
The motion to suppress was again raised and denied. 
Tr-317) The defense rested with a statement that no 
evidence could be presented in behalf of the defendant 
without jeopardizing his rights in the unlawful search 
and seizure or his rights on the ultimate issue of guilt 
or innocence. ( Tr-318) 
The matter was submitted to the jury and the de-
fendant was found guilty of the charge. Defendant's 
motion for new trial was argued on March 3, 1967 and 
denied. ( Tr-353) A stay of execution of the sentence 
was granted pending this appeal upon the filing of a 
certificate of probable cause signed by Justice A. H. 
Ellett. ( Tr-354) 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENY· 
ING THE APPELLANT STANDING TO SUP· 
PRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLA· 
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TION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES. 
This is a case of first impression in the State of 
Utah on the precise issue herein presented. In present-
ing this matter, it should be kept in mind that the de-
fendant's initial motion to suppress was denied after 
hearing on the sole basis that the defendant, under the 
facts hereafter referred to, did not have standing to 
raise the objection as to the violation of his consti-
tutional right against unlawful search and seizure. The 
hearing on this motion is included in the appeal tran-
script on pages 24-85, inclusive. At the time of the 
trial, the motion to suppress was renewed at the com-
mencement of the trial and after the State rested and 
denied each time. (Tr-92). A continuing objection 
was preserved. ( Tr-92) Since the precise issue is that 
of standing to assert a constitutional right, reference 
to the evidence in support of this point on appeal 
will not be limited to testimony adduced at the time 
of the hearing on the motion to suppress, but will in-
clude all the evidence produced at trial. 
The issue of standing is essentially two fold: Did 
the defendant have sufficient constitutionally protected 
interest in the premises searched, to wit: 553 Third 
Avenue, or Bedroom "A" (?) Did the defendant have 
a sufficient legal interest in the items seized where the 
offense with which he is charged requires some dominion 
and control by the defendant (?) 
13 
The question whether a specific interest in the 
premises unlawfully searched is a sufficient basis to 
object to an introduction of evidence so obtained is 
well settled. The United States Supreme Court dis-
cusses at length the interest in the premises as a requi-
site of an accused's standing to raise the question of 
the constitutionality of the search. In the leading case 
of United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 96 L. Ed. 59, 
(1951), the court sweeps away any heretofore subtle 
distinctions as that of lessee, sublessee, tenant by suffer-
ance of licensee and puts the issue of standing squarely 
upon the principles which appellant contends should 
be herein employed. 
The defendant, Jeffers, stored contraband nar-
cotics in a hotel room without the knowledge of the 
occupants who had permitted him to use the room. 
Without search or arrest warrants, police officers 
gained access to the room in the absence of the defend-
ant and the occupants, searched it, and seized the nar-
cotics. On the basis of the seized narcotics, defendant 
was convicted of possession. 
In an opinion by Justice Clark, six members of 
the court held that the constitutional guaranty against 
unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated, 
notwithstanding that "no property rights shall exist" 
in contraband goods, and that the defendant had stand-
ing to have the evidence suppressed although the il-
legal seizure was made in rooms rented by other per-
sons. 
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In the case at bar the officers searched without a 
warrant as the instrument itself gave no authority to 
search but rather to arrest and take into possession the 
juvenile. The Jeffers case, supra, as in this case should 
be resolved without regard to largely historical prop-
erty distinctions. Justice Clark in the Jeffers case 
comments on such distinctions when they are in conflict 
with principle in this manner, 
"The search and seizure are therefore, incap-
able of being untied. To hold that this search 
and seizure were lawful as to the defendant 
would permit a quibbling distinction to overturn 
a principal which was designed to protect a fun-
damental right." 
The government in the Jeffers case argued that 
the search did not invade the defendant's privacy and 
he therefore lacked the necessary standing to suppress. 
The significant act according to the government was 
the seizure, not the search. Because the defendant, 
Jeffers, had not paid the rent or was not a sublessee, 
he could not object to the search. The search was sec-
ondary. The court rejected such reasoning and has 
placed to rest such intangible subtleties which hereto-
fore were largely founded upon real property concepts 
where such concepts are inconsistent with constitutional 
rights. 
Permission to use the room is all that appellant 
herein must show to have the requisite standing to 
object to its search. The fact that his personal clothing 
and drivers license were in the room, supported by 
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Elizabeth Glasgow's testimony of the interval of occu. 
pancy by appellant herein ( Tr-136) , and the def end. 
ant's admission as to the return of his clothes (Tr-195-
196), conclusively permit him to object and to suppress 
the evidence therein obtained. The trial court had all of 
this evidence before him after the State rested. 
The Jeffers case, supra, also is cited by appellant 
for another novel proposition. The government con-
tended that no property rights within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment exist in narcotics because they 
are contraband goods in which the legislature declared 
no property rights exist. In disposing of this assertion 
the court said, 
"We are of the opinion that Congress, in abro-
gating property rights in such goods merely in· 
tended to aid in their forfeiture and thereby pre· 
vent the spread of the traffic in drugs rather 
than to abolish the exclusionary rule formulated 
by the courts in furtherance of the high purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment. See Re Fried, 161 
F.2d 453, 1 ALR 2d 996 (1947} ." 
Since the evidence illegally seized was contraband, 
the appellant was not entitled to have it returned to 
him. It being his property, for purposes of the exclu· 
sionary rule, he was entitled to motion to have it sup· 
pressed as evidence on his trial. 
On the second issue, the lower court offered the 
defendant the horns of a dilemma, to wit: to object 
to the introduction of evidence on the ground it was 
obtained by an illegal search and seizure, the accused 
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in order to show his standing to raise the objection must 
show an interest in the items searched or seized; on the 
other hand, by doing so he may establish an element 
. ' 
of the offense with which he is charged. 
'i\There, as here, the offense charged involves un-
lawful possession of the narcotics, there must be some 
dominion and control over the narcotics. State v. Win-
ters, 16 Uta:h 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, (1964). At the 
hearing on the motion to suppress, by disclaiming his 
interest, he loses his standing to object. At this hear-
ing, had he claimed any dominion or control of the 
narcotics, he would have· waived his defenses since any 
admission as to dominion and control would have been 
tantamount to a confession of one of the essential 
elements of the charge. The defendant thus impaled 
on the horns or the dilemma went to trial. 
The distinguished jurist Learned Hand. addressed 
himself to this. novel in~ongruity in Connolly, et al v. 
Medalie, 58, F.2d 629, (1932) where he said: 
"The power to suppress the use of evidence 
unlawfully obtained is a corollary of the :power 
to regain it. The prosecution is forbidden to 
profit by a wrong whose remedies are inadequate 
for the injury, unless they' inClude protedioil 
against any use of the property seized as a means 
of conviction. 
* * * 
Men may wince at admitting th;it they were 
the owners, or in possession, of contraband prop-
erty; may wish at once to secure the remedies 
of a possessor and avoid the perils of the part, 
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but equivocation will not serve. If they come as 
vict~s, they must take on. that role, with enough 
detail to encase them without question. The 
Petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament· 
but they were obliged to choose one horn of th~ 
dilemma.'' 
More properly, the prosecution herein is the party 
impaled on the horns of the dilemma. Jones v. United 
States, infra, Ball v. State, ____ Miss ..... , 194 S.2d 502 
(1967), United States v. Dean, 50 F.2d 905 (1931). 
In all of the aforesaid cases, the courts clearly indicated 
that where the indictment involves an assertion that the 
property was in the possession of or control of the 
defendant, the State cannot maintain that he was the 
owner of the property for the purpose of convicting 
him and, yet, was not the owner for the purpose of the 
search. In Ball v. State, supra, the court further stated 
that even if the defendant put his objection to the search 
on a false ground, as the prosecution claims, the search 
was nevertheless against his will and consent. The 
Mississippi Court found no merit in the prosecution's 
contention that the defendant claimed that he had 
rented the premises and was not in possesion and con· 
trol. The instant case is unlike State v. Montayne, 
18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P2d 958 (1966), which held that the 
sole pre-requisite is that the defendant claimed a pro· 
prietary or possesory interest in the searched or seized 
property. The Montayne case dealt with the charge of 
Robbery and Grand Larceny, not possession. 
The instant case is shot through with this incon· 
sistent position assumed by the prosecution. It is note· 
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worthy that the prosecutor, during the motion to sup-
press, initially makes no mention of the lack of stand-
ing of the defendant; rather he relies solely on the 
search warrant, (Tr-27} and permission of Mr. Brown, 
trustee of the premises. ( Tr-27) The lower court in 
his remarks at the conclusion of the motion makes no 
mention on the issue of standing although it was clearly 
raised. ( Tr-84) The standing issue was raised in the 
lower court's memorandum, wherein the court held 
that the defendant, having disclaimed .any interest in 
the premises or items seized, waived his right to object 
to the search and seizure. Memorandum, page 9. There 
is serious doubt as to whether there can be any consent 
to search where the defendant had not been fully ad-
vised of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Nickrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (1966},held 
under the principles of Johnson v. Zerbst, infra, that 
no consent was shown for f allure to so advise the de-
fendant. 
Other jurisdictions have had the _instant issue pre-
sented. Compare such statements as: 
Wiggin v. State, 206 P.373 (1922)-"All 
right" 
Helfen v. State, 181 P.2d 862 (1947)-"No, 
help yourself" 
Edwards v. State, 177 P.2d 143 (1947}-
"Look it over. You won't find anything." 
In each instance, the above jurisdictions held that there 
was no waiver. 
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A significant distinction should be observed in 
determining the waiver question. Each of the cases 
relied upon the lower court in concluding that a waiver 
was shown dealt with waivers made by the defendant 
or his counsel during the course of the trial or with 
waivers that unequivocally disavowed any property ' 
interest in the premises or items seized. The facts in each , 
of the cases are distinguishable. Moreover, six of the 1 
ten cases were decided before United States v. Jeffers, i 
supra, which has flatly rejected the historical property 
distinctions as a basis for determining the standing 
issue. No federal decisions decided after the Jeffers ' 
case were cited by the lower court. It is doubtful that ' 
the federal cases would still prevail since the current 
trend in this general area is one of establishing a policy 
against any waiver or disclaimer in the absence of clear 
and convincing proof. 
A waiver of a right presupposes that the right 
exists. In this case, the lower court found that the de· 
fendant has standing but waived his right to contest 
the illegal search and seizure because he, in answer to 
the officer's inquiry, said, "I am here to mow the lawn." 
(Tr-49, 156, 170) This is clear error. 
The doctrine of waiver is well embedded in our 
law. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, : 
82 L. Ed 1461 ( 1938) states that any waiver must be ! 
shown to be intelligently and freely made. When the ! 
State relies upon a waiver of any constitutional right, 1 
it is incumbent that the waiver be proved by clear and 
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convincing proof. 79 CJS 812. The evidence as to waiver 
rests solely upon the statement that the defendant 
stated that he was there to mow the lawn. This falls 
drastically short of the criteria set forth in the Johnson 
case. 
The statement was made after the officer entered 
the premises with Mr. Brown's permission. (Tr-54) 
Moreover, officer Fran Kari informed Mr. Brown that 
she had a searcch and seizure warrant although she 
never exhibited it. (Tr-154, 42, 29, 165) This amounts 
to submission to official coercion of the type .that is 
condemned in Wiggin v. State, 206 P.373 (1922) The 
defendant has a right to assume the warrant was 
valid. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 139, 292 
S.W. 771 ( 1934). The obvious show of force of the 
three police officers, initial entry, and repres.entation 
of a legally valid search and seizure warrant is .not a 
waiver or consent freely given, but mere acquiescence 
to the powers of the police. This cannot meet the test 
expressed in Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 
(1951) where the court stated: 
"The obtaining of a search warrant may be 
waived by an individual and he may give his 
consent to search and seizure but such waiver or 
consent must be proven by clear and positive 
testimony and there must be no duress or coer-
cion, actual or implied, and the government must 
show a consent that is unequivocal and specific, 
freely and intelligently given and the burden 
of the government is particularly heavy ... " 
21 
Appellant herein was charged with a possession: 
0ffense and possession offenses present special prob.~ 
lems. In the Jeffers and Jones cases the courts clearly, 
held no invasion of privacy need be established before • 
the accused has standing to object to a search and 
seizure. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in the case of DeForte v. Mancusi, decided in 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, June 28th, 36 Law 
I 
Week, Page 2022, ( 1967) in expanding the standing ' 
to suppress concept held that the mere fact that the, 
search was directed against a person will give him 
1 
standing to object to evidence illegally obtained at i 
trial. 
The United States Supreme Court recently re· i 
solved the dilemma in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.; 
257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960). The accused was charged 
with unlawful possession of narcotics located in an 
apartment in which he was a guest of the owner. Jus· 
tice Frankfurter, speaking for eight members of the 
court, held that because of accused's presence in the 
apartment, the search was legal. He had standing to 
raise the question of the legality of the search and he i 
did not lose this standing merely because he fails to : 
I 
allege either that he owned or possessed the property ~ 
seized or that he had a possessory interest in the prem· · 
ises searched. The possession on the basis of which it ; 
is sought to convict suffices to give the accused standing i 
and his timely motion to suppress should have been 
granted. 
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In the Jones case, the court in laying down the :mle 
said: 
"The same element in this prosecution which 
has caused a dilemma, i.e., that possession both 
convicts and confers standing eliminates any 
necessity for a preliminary showing of an inter-
est in the premises searched or the property 
seized which ordinarily is required when stand-
ing is challenged." 
• • • 
"The petitioner's conviction flows from his pos-
session of the narcotics at the time of the search. 
Yet the fruits of the search upon which the con-
viction depends were admitted into evidence on 
the ground that Petitioner did not have po·sses-
sion of narcotics at that time." 
"It is not consonant with the amenities, to put 
it mildly, of the administration of criminal jus-
tice to sanction such squarely contradictory as-
sertions of power by the government. The pos-
session on the basis of which petitioner is to 
be and was convicted suffices to give him stand-
ing." 
Under this case, appellant herein suggests that the 
filing of the Information against the accused gave 
appellant the standing as a matter of law to object 
to the search and seizure. The prosecution, thus com-
mitted, must permit the accused to object to the search. 
If the search be otherwise sustained then the convic-
tion must stand. The prosecution cannot give the ac-
cused standing by its own act and then deny him stand-
ing to object because of a restriction on the right to 
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object which only the prosecution can enjoy. Such a 
one sided use of a concept, the contours of which escape 
use by the defendant, is repugnant to any system ol 
fairness. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENY. 
ING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE 
SEARCH 'VARRANT IN THAT THE ISST.:-
ANCE THEREOF WAS VIOLATIVE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. 
AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZ-
1 
URE. 
It is submitted that the search warrant referred' 
to in the entire record was obtained without the proper• 
safeguards as provided under the Juvenile Court legis·. 
lation, Utah Criminal Code and State and Federal' 
Constitution, Fourth Amendment. 
Utah Code Annotated, 55-10-23 (as amended:. 
1953) is the applicable statute. (The new Juvenile 
Court Act did not take effect until July 1, 1965.) This: 
provides: 
"Where it appears to the court on petition 
filed by any person who in the opinion of the 
court is bona fide acting in the interest of any 
child, that there is reasonable cause to suspect. 
that such child under the age of 18 years has 
been or is being ill-treated, is dependent or neg· 
lected, in any place within the jurisdiction .of 
the court, in a manner likely to cause the child 
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unnecessary suffering, or to be injurious to its 
health or morals, the court may issue a warrant 
authorizing any probation or other peace officer 
named therein to search for the child . . . " 
This section further provides must be served upon 
the parent or guardian or on the custodian of the 
premises. 
Under this provision the search warrant was issued. 
(Defendant's Exhibit D-1, (hearing on the motion to 
suppress) It is respectfully submitted that the above 
provision is blatantly unconstitutional in that it vio-
lates the mandate contained in the Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 14 which states that: 
" ... and no warrant shall be issued but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized." 
This constitutional provision places a limit on the 
authority of the legislature in enacting search warrant 
provision for special circumstances. Thus if the Juve-
nile Court statute does not meet the constitutional man-
date, it must fall and the practices thereunder must fall 
also. 
This court has so held in Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 
Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939). This court struck down 
a statute which permitted the court to issue a search 
warrant for property "whenever any person shall make 
affidavit before the court of competent jurisdiction 
that he have reason to believe and does believe that 
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any receptacle . . . is in the possession of any persor 
engaged in any business specified herein." J usti~ 
McDonough stated: 
"Since our constitution requires a showing ol 
probable cause to support a search warrant an~ 
Section 95-2-10 requires merely an affidavit on 
information and belief, we hold, in line with tht 
over-whelming weight of authority in the federal 
and state courts, that such affidavit does not; 
meet the constitutional requirements and thti 
statute is therefore void." ' 
Under this case, the conclusion is inescapable that tht: 
Juvenile Court statute insofar as it authorizes the issu.i 
ance of a search warrant is in derogation with the Utan\ 
Constitution and is therefore void. This conclusion IB[ 
re-enforced when one considers that the current Juve·: 
nile Court Act requires an affidavit sworn to by a peace\ 
officer and requires a finding by the court of probable' 
cause to believe before a search warrant is issued. See 
Utah Code Annotated 55-10-lll (as amended, 1965) 
Assuming arguendo that the "reasonable cause to 
suspect" requirement of the statute can be saved by an 
interpretation by this court that reasonable cause ~ 
contended to be probable cause. (See Allen v. Lina· 
beck, supra at page 923), this interpretation could not 
restore the statute to constitutionality. The "oath and 
affirmation" requirement is conspicuously lacking in 
the Juvenile Court procedure. The statute requirei 
merely that a petition be filed. This falls short of an 
oath and affirmation. In the instant case, a verified 
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petition was filed. (See recital contained in the search 
and seizure warrant) . Nevertheless, this does not re-
store the constitutional requirement because the statute 
requires the same person who files the petition be the 
same person who makes application for the search and 
seizure warrant. Here, there is no showing that officer 
Fran Kari was the same person who filed the petition 
yet she obtained the search and seizure warrant. In fact, 
she did not sign the petition. ( Tr-16) . 
Following the same arguendo, and aside from the 
breach in procedure utilized in the instant case, the 
statute does not permit a search and seizure warrant 
in cases where the assertion is that of delinquency. This 
statute is an emergency procedure and restricts the 
Juvenile Court in the issuance of warrants to cases 
where the child "has been or is ill-treated, is dependent 
or neglected, . . . , in a manner likely to cause the child 
unnecessary suffering, or to be injurious to its health 
or morals." The issuance of the warrant is not provided 
in cases where the allegation is for delinquency as being 
a runaway. This statute is an emergency procedure 
designed to protect the child where immediate and 
necessary action is required. No emergency facts were 
provided the Juvenile Court Judge, nor were any stated 
in the search and seizure warrant itself. In Re State in 
the Interest of Johnson, no U 500, 175 P.2d 486 
(1946) 
The statement of Officer Kari in obtaining the 
search warrant was insufficient as a matter of law in 
}.7 
providing the Juvenile Court Judge sufficient informa. 
tion with which to make an independent judgment on 
the reasonable or probable cause to issue the warrant 
All of her statements were based upon hearsay anu 
informants, the reliability of whom was never shown. 
Clearly, hearsay alone will not. render the search war. 
rant invalid. However, where the information as to tht 
whereabouts of Elizabeth Ann Glasgow was obtaineu 
from "her investigation" or "after contacting several 
people," and no further inquiry made or request bi 
the Judge, there is no basis for the issuance of the searcn 
warrant. (Tr-12, 14) Nothing appears to have been 
observed personally by Officer Fran Kari, nor Wal 
there any assertion that she had personal knowledge. 
(Tr-15) Illustrative facts are found in Aguilar v.; 
Texas, 378 U.S. 109 (1964) where the court struck 
down a search warrant on the grounds that the magis·: 
trate "necessary accepted without question the infor· 
mant's suspicions, belief and mere conclusions" ana 
was "not able to judge for himself the persuasiveness 
of the facts relied upon ... to show probable cause," 
and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 
725, 46 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960) where the court said: 
"We hold in N abhanson v. United States ... , 
that an affidavit does not establish probable cause 
which merely states the affiant's belief that there 
is cause to search, without stating the facts upon 
which that belief was based." 
It is respectfully submitted that the procedures 
in Juvenile Court are to be no less scrupulous with 
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regard to constitutional rights merely because of the 
immaturity of its wards. In Re Williams, 267 N.Y.S. 
2d 91 ( 1966) The statute in question and the procedure 
employed must be examined by this court in light of 
the In Re Gault, 35 L. W. 4399 (1967) and principles 
set forth therein. The appellant asks foresight, not hind-
sight. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PER· 
MITTING ORAL TESTl1\i10NY CONCERN. 
ING ITEMS SEIZED BY THE POLICE A'I 
THE REQUEST AND WITH THE CONSENT 
OF THE LANDLORD. 
The police, after discovering the narcotics, pro-
ceeded to remove men's clothing, a portable TV, Old 
Gold cigarettes, auto battery and wrist watches. (Tr-
71) Moreover, a drivers license was confiscated. (Tr-
301) None of these items were listed in the search 
warrant nor were any of the items claimed by the State 
to be evidence of the whereabouts of Elizabeth Ann 
Glasgow. These items were taken from Bedroom "A" 
at the request of and with the consent of Mr. Brown, 
the trustee, ( Tr-71) despite the fact that the rent was 
fully paid. (Tr-132) Nor could it be successfully main-
tained that the items taken were contraband or sus-
pected stolen property. (Tr-72) The items were taken 
for safekeeping in the police evidence room. (Tr-72) 
1'he items themselves were not produced at trial, with 
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the exception of the drivers license, Exhibit 18. Ora 
statements of the defendant concerning the return 0 
some of the items were introduced through the tes!i-
mony of Officer Lindsey, over defendant's objection 
( Tr-180-193) Trial court denied the motion to su~ 
press the oral statements. 
The testimony of the officer concerning oral aa. 
missions as to ownership of the items taken is clearlr, 
inadmissible as "fruits from the poisonous tree. 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S 
385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 ( 1920). 
It is well settled in Utah that a landlord or similar'. 
person cannot give a consent to search and seize ite!lli 
from a room rented by another party. Stoner v. Ca//.! 
fornia, 376 U.S. 483 ( 1964), Chapman v. Uniteli 
I 
States, 365 U.S. 610 ( 1961), State v. Louden' 
379 U.S. 1 ( 1964) . It needs no legal gymnastics to'I 
suggest that this same principle applies equally wi~! 
the removal of items from the room and testimonr; 
relating thereto. The removal of the items wa1 1
1 
clearly without any legal sanction Or justification 
The consent of the property trustee cannot bind th1, 
defendant nor vicariously convey away his rights. Tht! 
trustee of the property, acting as a landlord, had no 
•I 
right to declare the premises abandoned, or otherw1s1\ 
evict the tenants and secure the personal items of the, 
tenants where the rent was current and no notice haai 
been served. The items having been legally confiscated,:! 
any oral testimony is suppressable under the poison] 
I 
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fruit doctrine. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471. (1963) 
See McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st 
Cir. 1955) where testimony as to what the searching 
officers observed during an illegal search was excluded. 
The court said in discussing the full measure of the con-
stitutional protection: 
"We find no basis in the cases or in logic for 
distinguishing between the introduction into evi-
dence of physical objects illegally taken and the 
introduction of testimony concerning objects il-
legally observed. We are aware of no case which 
makes this distinction. Moreover, it seems to 
us that the protection offered by the constitu-
tion against unreasonable search and seizure 
would be narrowed down to a virtual nullity by 
any such view of law, which in effect would grant 
to the victims of unreasonable search and seizure 
the rather unsubstantial right to be convicted on 
the basis of evidence which was illegally ob-
served rather than evidence which was illegally 
taken." 
In French v. State, 198 So.2d 668 (1967), the 
Florida court states: 
"Once the trial court found that the tangible 
evidence obtained, as a result of an illegal search 
and seizure, could not be introduced into evi-
dence it should have precluded the introduction 
into evidence of oral or written confessions of 
the appellants, which were obtained after the 
police official confronted them with the tangible 
evidence which was illegally seized." 
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The admission of the drivers license is clearh! 
•I 
error. Under the above cases, the court should havij 
been excluded the same from the jury. All of the iteru1 
I 
seized and the oral testimony describing the items a1' 
men's suits, shorts, etc., were used as evidence probatiw\ 
to the defendant's occupancy of Bedroom "A". Theit: 
items were taken as mere evidence to establish tht[ 
element of possession. The "mere evidence rule" wouldl 
preclude the taking of such items. Gouled v. Unitea\' 
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1960). Clearly, this case hai 
been overruled, inWarren, Maryland Penitentiary V.\ 
Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967). However the priori 
case was applicable when this matter was heard bythe, 
trial court and should have been binding upon him 
and this court. The court, in the Gouled case, stated 
that search warrant "may not be used as a means o! 
gaining access to a man's house or office and paperi 
solely for the purpose of making searches to secure 
evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal 
proceedings. . . " This case, through the principles 
enunciated in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, (1963) 
should be given serious consideration by this court in 
determining the scope of police searches as applied 
in the State of Utah. The standard of reasonablenesi 
is the same under the Fourth Amendment and the 
Fourteenth amendment. The words of Learned Hand 
is particularly applicable in the instant case insofar as 
the mere evidence rule is involved. He stated that the 
"limitations upon the fruits to be gathered tend to 
limit the quest itself." Police exploratory searches and 
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seizures would thus be prevented. By reason of the 
Fourth Amendment, which is designed to protect the 
right of privacy, "the police may not rummage among 
personal effects, no matter how formally perfect their 
authority may be." They may not seize them. If they 
do, they may not be used in evidence. Any invasion 
whatsoever of those personal effects is "unreasonable" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 
Warden v. Hayden, supra, (Justice Douglas, dissent-
ing opinion.) 
The Hayden case admittedly rules out the here-
tofore distinction between mere evidence and fruits, 
instrumentalities and contraband. No such distinction 
was found to be warranted by the language of the 
Fourth Amendment. The right of privacy is no more 
disturbed in a search for mere evidence then in a search 
for the other. The Hayden case, however, is not ap-
plicable here for two reasons: ( 1) the decision was 
handed after the trial of the instant case, ( 2) the facts 
are distinguishable in that the search in the Hayden 
case was deemed valid as a result as "hot pursuit" and 
the officers were looking for a robbery suspect and items 
to connect the suspect to the robbery. In the instant 
case, the initial search was unlawful as being executed 
through an improper warrant and on consent of the 
landlord not binding on the part of the defendant. 
Moreover, the defendant was not a suspect for the 
commission of any wrongdoing at the time of the search 
nor were the officers looking for any items to connect 
the defendant to any wrongdoings. They were only 
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looking for evidence which would lead them to tn1 
whereabouts of the delinquent child. ( Tr-34, 122, 46
1 
To permit the instant search to stand is to give th:'. 
police unlicensed discretion to seek out items in thi
1 
far corners of houses, and intrude into the private af. 
fairs, documents, and family records, thereby violatini 
the sanctity of the home far beyond that which b 
necessary to perform their duties, preserving the peaci. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
SUPPRESSING THE STATEMENTS OF THE 
DEFENDANT MADE WHILE IN THE CUS· 
TODY OF A POLICE CAR AFTER THE 
CHARGE WAS FILED IN THE ABSENCE 
OF THE WARNINGS UNDER MIRANDA V. 
ARIZONA. 
A hearing was held outside of the presence ol 
the jury regarding certain statements made by the de· 
fendant to Officer Lindsey. (Tr-175) Two conversa· 
tions were had concerning the clothing found in Bed· 
room "A", each probative to the possible occupancy ol 
Bedroom "A". ( Tr-177) Each conversation was afte1 
the complaint had been filed and the defendant wa: 
a definite suspect. ( Tr-176) The first conversatior 
was a phone call initiated by the defendant; the seconr 
was a conversation in a police car while transportin! 
the defendant from the court room to the jail. (Tr 
178, 179) The phone conversation was to the effec 
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that the defendant wanted some things that had been 
taken from the apartment, however, he "didn't care 
to say much about it. [case]" (Tr-179) The second 
conversation, in the custody of a police car, began by 
a discussion of "our various philosophies concerning 
drugs and narcotics, and crime, in general." (Tr-179) 
At this time, defendant said he wanted his stuff back. 
(Tr-179) Officer Lindsey at the time was well aware 
that the defendant was represented by counsel. ('fr-
181) The Miranda warnings were ignored in each 
conversation. 
The trial court admitted both conversations over 
defendant's objection. The appellant submits that 
while there may be some justification for the trial court 
not to exclude the first conversation over the phone as 
being voluntary, non-custodial and non-interrogatory, 
there is no justification for not excluding the sec_ond 
conversation. This conversation was had while the de-
fendant was a suspect; inf act, after he had been charged 
by the interrogating officer. (Tr-183) He was in the 
physical custody of Officer Lindsey in the police c;:ar 
and the admission was the result of a subtle .interro-
gation process by the same officer. Absence of Miranda 
warnings renders the statements made inadmissible. 
(Tr-181) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966}, 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964} The ad-
mission of the statements constitutes reversible error 
without regard to the prejudicial effect of said state-
ments. The harmless error rule does not apply to the 
admission of statements taken in violation of the privi-
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lege against self-incrimination. Spano v. New YorR 
I 
360 U.S. 315, (1959); Haynes v. Washington, an 
U.S. 503 (1962). 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully submits that the lower 
court committed error in rejecting appellant's claims 
with regard to the evidence and oral testimony at the 
time of the trial. Disclaimer or waiver is not to be 
taken lightly where constitutional rights are at stake; 
nor should police be permitted to use the pretext of a 
search warrant obtained in Juvenile Court in order to 
search and seize items totally unrelated to the purpose 
of the search warrant which goes beyond the ends con· 
templated by the Juvenile Court Act. Oral testimonr 
regarding items found and defendant's statemenb 
were put before the jury in total violation of the con· 
stitutional mandates which should not be ignored br 
this Court. All of the evidence was improperly re· 
ceived; consequently the appellant requests that the 
case be remanded with instructions for re-trial in ac· 
cordance with the appellant's position sought on appeal; 
or, in the alternative, the appellant requests that this 
Honorable Court reverse the judgment and conviction 
and enter a judgment of acquittal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert Van Seiver of 
Karras, Van Seiver & Yocom 
J imi Mitsunaga 
Legal Defender 
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